Protecting Consumers from Consumer Credit Counseling by Hurst, John
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 8
2005
Protecting Consumers from Consumer Credit
Counseling
John Hurst
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Hurst, Protecting Consumers from Consumer Credit Counseling, 9 N.C. Banking Inst. 159 (2005).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol9/iss1/8
Protecting Consumers from Consumer Credit Counseling
I. INTRODUCTION
With $30,000 in credit card debt, Jolanta Troy's divorce left her
unable to pay her bills, but she became more hopeful after seeing a
television commercial for the non-profit company AmeriDebt.1
Concerned she would lose her home, Ms. Troy contacted AmeriDebt
where a counselor suggested she enter a debt management plan (DMP).2
Under a DMP, Ms. Troy would send one reduced monthly payment
directly to AmeriDebt, and AmeriDebt would in turn pay her creditors.
Ms. Troy wanted to weigh her options, but after she hung up the
AmeriDebt counselor called her back four times.4 The counselor
reminded Ms. Troy that AmeriDebt was a non-profit organization and
warned her she needed AmeriDebt's help.5 Eventually, Ms. Troy
relented and agreed to a DMP with AmeriDebt.6 Although she remitted
her first payment of $783.00 to AmeriDebt, Ms. Troy began to receive
calls from her creditors demanding payment.7 Ms. Troy contacted
AmeriDebt and learned that her initial payment was considered a
"contribution" to AmeriDebt. Missing payments to creditors only
worsened Ms. Troy's fiscal condition and forced her to file for
bankruptcy. 9
Jolanta Troy's story is not uncommon amongst debtors who go
1. Profiteering in a Non-profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit Counseling
Before S. Subcomm. on Investigations, 108th Cong. 16 (2004) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]
(statement of Jolanta Troy, Customer, AmeriDebt).
2. Id.
3. See CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CREDIT COUNSELING
IN CRISIS: THE IMPACT ON CONSUMERS OF FUNDING CUTS, HIGHER FEES AND AGGRESSIVE
NEW MARKET ENTRANTS 6 (Apr. 2003), at http://www.consumerfed.org/credit-counseling-
report.pdf.
4. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 16 (statement of Jolanta Troy, Customer,
AmeriDebt).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 17.
9. Id.
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to Credit Counseling Agencies (CCAs) for help.' ° Advocacy groups
including the Consumer Federation of America and the National
Consumer Law Center have documented these practices among a select
group of Recent Entrants to the credit counseling industry." These
Recent Entrants systematically deceive their customers and prey on
individuals who are already too indebted to pay their bills. 2
Part II of this note provides a brief overview of the origins and
early practices of CCAs. 3 Part III describes the practices of Recent
Entrants to the credit counseling industry.' 4 Part IV discusses current
state and federal law regulating CCAs and the weaknesses of these
methods of enforcement. 15  Finally, Part V argues that stricter IRS
enforcement of non-profit status is the best method of regulating
CCAs.
16
II. EARLY CREDIT COUNSELING DEVELOPMENT AND PRACTICES
Understanding the complaints of consumer advocates against
these controversial institutions requires a short analysis of the
development of consumer credit counseling. Credit counseling first
emerged in the 1950's, when credit institutions helped to establish local
CCAs to limit bankruptcy filings and avoid potential losses. 7
Traditionally, CCAs provided one-on-one counseling 8 aimed at
10. See CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 31-
32.
11. See MAJORITY & MINORITY STAFFS OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, 108TH CONG., PROFITEERING IN A NON-PROFIT INDUSTRY: ABUSIVE
PRACTICES IN CREDIT COUNSELING 6-7 (2004) [hereinafter MAJORITY & MINORITY]. Senate
scrutiny focused upon complaints against Cambridge Credit Counseling, AmeriDebt, and
Amerix although this is by no means an exhaustive list. Id. Because the credit counseling
industry contains beneficial and harmful institutions, offending institutions are called Recent
Entrants throughout this Note. The term recent is not chosen to imply that all new credit
counseling agencies are unscrupulous, but rather recognizes that the more harmful practices
to consumer do tend to come from new CCAs. CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3.
12. See Jeff Gelles, Debt Counseling Can be Anything But; A Probe Finds these
Nonprofits can be Fronts for Operations Preying on Those in Financial Distress,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 25, 2004, at E04.
13. See infra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 36-78 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 79-119 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
17. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 25.
18. Id. at 2-3.
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teaching the debtor how to effectively budget.' 9 Counseling was an
effective way to ensure that debtors would alleviate current debt and
avoid excessive indebtedness in the future.2 ° When appropriate to the
debtor's financial condition, traditional CCAs also offered a DMP.21 A
DMP is essentially an agreement by the creditor to give concessions to
the debtor.22 The CCA facilitates this agreement by negotiating creditor
concessions.2 3 Traditional CCAs facilitated the process because of their
familiarity with the concession policies of various creditors.24 The
concessions commonly obtained included more favorable repayment
25terms, such as reduced interest payments, waiver of late fees,
forgiveness of overdue payments, or "re-aging" of the account.26 Once
the DMP was negotiated, the debtor agreed to make monthly payments
to the CCA in the amount of the debtor's monthly obligation under the
DMP.27
19. CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., IMPACT OF CREDIT COUNSELING ON SUBSEQUENT
BORROWER CREDIT USAGE AND PAYMENT BEHAVIOR MONOGRAPH 36 9 (Mar. 2002), at
http://www.msb.edu/prog/crc/pdf/M36.pdf. The study considered consistent themes of
counseling to be:
Ways to increase income .... decrease household spending, .. . be clear
about priorities and pay high priority debt first, keep fewer lines of
credit open, reduce debt levels, pay larger amounts on those accounts
that have a combination of larger balances and higher interest rates,
make consistent and timely monthly payments, adjust or reformat
existing accounts through refinancing, seek lower financing options,
work with creditors directly to get payments/interest reduced; [r]esolve
credit reporting inaccuracies, don't apply for credit just to see if you can
get accepted; [a]void accumulating unnecessary inquiries on the credit
report, review legal rights and options available, save for upcoming
major expenditures.
Id.
20. See id. at 3-4; Mark Furletti, Consumer Credit Counseling: Credit Card Issuer's
Perspective. PAYMENT CENTER F.R.B. OF PHIL., (Sept. 2003), at http://www.phil.frb.org/
pcc/discussion/Chase_- JuniperCCCS.pdf [hereinafter Furletti] at 5-6.
21. See CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., supra note 19, at 1.
22. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 2 & 4; See CREDIT RESEARCH CTR.,
supra note 19, at 1.
23. See id.
24. See CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 21-
22. The rates of concession are maintained as policies by creditors. Id.
25. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 2 & 4; See CREDIT RESEARCH CTR,
supra note 19, at 1-2.
26. See CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., supra note 19, at 1; CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 21. "Re-aging" of a credit card account eliminates
delinquencies from a debtor's credit history. Id.
27. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 2 & 4.
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Traditionally, the debtor only paid small, sometimes voluntary,
fees to the CCA.28 The primary funding for CCAs came from "fair
share payments" paid by creditors. 29  The amount of the fair share
payment was simply based on a percentage of the funds collected from
the debtors.3 ° Creditors willingly accepted the costs of concessions and
fair share payments because they believed that the combination of the
counseling and the DMP would increase the chances of collecting their
debts.3
As recently as 1993, ninety percent of CCAs in the United
States belonged to the National Foundation for Credit Counseling
(NFCC), the primary self-regulatory body for CCAs.32 The NFCC
imposed regulations upon their member institutions including: (1)
requiring a certain percentage of assets to be allocated to informational
programs, (2) requiring comprehensive counseling, and (3) limiting
fees.33 Membership in the NFCC was nearly universal because creditors
more readily negotiated with NFCC members.34 Creditors maintained
oversight of CCAs through membership on the NFCC national board of
directors.35
III. RECENT ENTRANTS TO CREDIT COUNSELING AND CHANGING
PRACTICES
A. An End to Self-Regulation
In 1994, numerous non-member CCAs sued the NFCC on
antitrust claims.36 The NFCC settled the suit and agreed to no longer
28. See id. at 2-3.
29. See id. at 25; CREDIT RESEARCH CTR, supra note 19, at 2.
30. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 2. Fair Share payments are typically
paid based upon the "aggregate debtor payments managed by a CCA." Id. See generally
CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 10. In 2002, the
average percentage was 8%. Id.
31. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 2.
32. See CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 7.
33. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 24. On the matter of fees, NFCC
members are forbidden from refusing services on the grounds of inability to pay a fee. Id.
34. See id. at 2.
35. See id. at 26.
36. Garden State Consumer Credit Counseling v. Nat'l Foundation for Consumer
Credit, No. 94-1141 (E.D.N.Y, filed Mar. 14, 1994); See also In re: Consumer Credit
Counseling Services Antitrust Litigation, No. 97-1741, 1997 W.L. 755019 (D.D.C.);
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grant creditors seats on its national board of directors.37 As a result,
there was no longer an incentive for CCAs to join the NFCC.38 Without
this self-regulation CCAs have evolved in a regulatory vacuum.
39
Propelled by increasing consumer debt over the past ten years,40
the demand for credit counseling services grew dramatically. 4' As a
result, the number of CCAs skyrocketed, but these Recent Entrants
refused to adopt the traditional NFCC practices. 42 From 1993 to 2003
participation by CCAs in the NFCC declined from 90% to
approximately 15%. 4
B. Focus on DMPs
Unlike traditional CCAs, Recent Entrants market DMPs44 and
offer no actual counseling.45 Evidence shows the counseling programs
dramatically increase the chances that payments will be made to the
MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 26. The NFCC changed its name from the
National Foundation for Consumer Credit to the National Foundation for Credit Counseling
in 2000. Non-Profit Credit Counseling Organizations: Hearing before the House Subcomm.
on Oversight, 108th Cong. 44 (2003) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of W. Patrick
Boisclair, Chairman of Board of Trustees, NFCC).
37. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 26.
38. See id. at 26; CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note
3, at 7.
39. Id.
40. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 1. "Consumer debt has more than
doubled in the past ten years. The nation's credit card debt is currently $735 billion-an
average of nearly $7,000 per household." Id.
41. See CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., supra note 19, at 1. NFCC member agencies have
more then doubled their responses to debtors between 1990 and 2000. Id. In 2000, NFCC
members counseled over 880,000 new clients. Id. In 2000, over two million Americans
pursued credit counseling services. Id.
42. See CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 7.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 20.
45. See Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 15 (statement of John Pohlman, Former
Employee, Cambridge Credit). Pohlman describes how no other costs were considered in
the budgeting. Unlike his prior work in credit counseling where it typically took over an
hour to complete counseling, Cambridge expected each call to take ten to fifteen minutes.
Id. A customer of Cambridge Credit described how he was simply offered a DMP and
quoted a price after giving a list of his credit cards and debts. Id. at 12-13 (statement of
Raymond Schuck, Customer, Cambridge Credit). A former employee of AmeriDebt
described being told to limit calls to less then fifteen minutes. Senate Hearing, supra note
1, at 17-18 (statement of John Paul Allen, Former Employee, AmeriDebt); MAJORITY &
MINORITY, supra note 11, at 2.
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creditor.46 In fact, the results of this empirical study by the Credit
Research Center found that substantive counseling not only increased
the tendency of debtors to improve their credit but that the impact is
greater for individuals entering with greater credit problems.4' The loss
of educational services, therefore, undermines a central function of
credit counseling.48
C. Dispute over Fair Share Payments
Recent Entrants argue that the elimination of counseling is a
consequence of creditors reducing fair share payments.49 While fair
share payments have been decreasing,5° evidence indicates that this is
because debtors no longer receive one-on-one counseling from CCAs,
and creditors believe that DMPs alone do not yield increased debt
collection.5 Creditors also fear that profit driven CCAs absorb the
value of concessions as profits rather than passing these benefits on to
the consumers. 52
Despite the motivations of creditors in decreasing fair share
payments, their reduction actually harms traditional CCAs more than
Recent Entrants. 53 Traditional CCAs receive smaller fees from debtors
while providing costly counseling.54 With revenue from fair share
payments declining and the cost of supplying complete counseling
services increasing, many NFCC members are closing their doors.55
While reducing fair share payments has been at best a crude
instrument by which creditors have responded to concerns about Recent
Entrants, the 1994 suit against the NFCC has made creditors leery of
46. See CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., supra note 19, at 3-4 & 30.
47. See id.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
49. See House Hearing, supra note 36, at 77 (statement of W. Michael Barnhart,
Coalition for Responsible Credit Practices).
50. See CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 10.
51. CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 10. "In
2002, one creditor, Household Credit Services, decreased its contribution to three percent
for DMPs set up by phone." Id.; Furletti, supra note 20, at 3.
52. See Furletti, supra note 20, at 4.
53. See CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 10-11
& 20-21.
54. See id.
55. See id. An IRS survey in 1999 found that half of the sampled NFCC members
showed deficits and that that thirty percent showed low margins. Id.
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adopting fair share policies that favor traditional CCAs over Recent
Entrants.56  Some more innovative creditors employ a minimum
standards model whereby CCAs must meet certain minimum standards
before the CCA receives any fair share payments.5 7 Another option for
administering fair share payments is a "pay for performance plan. 58
For example, MBNA offers only a two percent fair share payment for
new accounts and increases the payments as the account successfully
matures.59 Minimum standards models and pay for performance plans
are sound policies because they create incentives for CCAs to ensure
successful payments by debtors. 60 This should minimize the enrollment
of individuals who would be better advised to declare bankruptcy and
might even encourage better individual counseling if Recent Entrants
can be convinced of the effectiveness of such educational programs.
Unfortunately, creditors are loathe to coordinate common policies
because this might subject them to further antitrust claims.6'
D. Tactics to Market the DMP
Recent Entrants use high pressure boiler room tactics in pushing
DMPs.62  During a Senate hearing, a former Cambridge Credit
56. See Furletti, supra note 20, at 6.
57. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 27-28. Bank One for example
requires: Accreditation, Certification of counselors, Fees meeting the Bank One Guidelines,
and Bank One must approve the marketing of the CCA. Id.
58. See id. at 26 & 28. "Common ways to measure success rates are (1) retention rate
(the length of time a consumer stays on the DMP), (2) declination rate (the number of
proposed DMPs declined by the creditor), and (3) a combination of those measures as well
as other factors." Id.
59. See id. at 27-28.
60. Id.
61. See Furletti, supra note 20, at 6.
62. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 12-14 (statement of Raymond Schuck, Customer,
Cambridge Credit). Schuck described how he was told to send his initial payment as
quickly as possible to be enrolled as soon as possible in the program. It is of course ironic
that this first payment did not initiate payments to his creditors but rather this was held until
later. Id.; Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 16 (statement of Jolanta Troy, Customer,
AmeriDebt). Jolanta Troy testified that:
After this call, the counselor called me back ... four different times.
Every time the counselor called, she would tell me how bad my
situation was and that I needed to do something about it. This counselor
also said that AmeriDebt was a non-profit organization, "like a charity,"
and that I needed their help. She was very pushy and almost degrading.
She made me feel embarrassed and ashamed, but I eventually decided to
go on the program.
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employee testified that a leader board which ranked employees by their
sales was present at the front of the calling room.63 In fact, many CCAs
compensate their DMP sales force on a commission basis.64 These
tactics seem more insidious when one considers the aggressive
advertising of non-profit status by CCAs.65 Furthermore, many CCAs
directly lie about the ability of DMPs to take debtors out of debt.
66
E. Excessive and Unfair Fees
Recent Entrants charge excessive fees for DMPs. 67  For
example, Cambridge Credit charges the debtor a monthly charge equal
to 10% of the each monthly payment,68 while NFCC members charge an
average monthly fee of $14.00.69 Recent Entrants also charge excessive
setup fees, often holding the entire first payment to the DMP as such.7 °
Compared to the $23.09 average setup fee charged by NFCC members,
holding the entire first payment represents an exorbitant fee. 1 It should
be remembered that many debtors cannot afford to make payments on
their consumer debt, much less an additional payment to the CCA in the
same month.72
Furthermore, many CCAs do not properly explain the practice
of holding the first payment,73 often inciting debtors to prematurely
Id.
63. See id. at 14-16 (statement of John Pohlman, Former Employee, Cambridge Credit).
64. See id. at 14-15 (statement of John Pohlman, Former Employee, Cambridge Credit).
Counselors earned up to 25% of the initial set up fee among other sales incentives. Id.
65. See CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 26.
66. David Breitkopf, The FTC Puts Some Heat On Debt-Repair Agencies, AM.
BANKER, May 10, 2004 at 6.
67. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 22-23.
68. Id. at 23.
69. Id.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 71-78.
71. Senate Hearing, supra note I, at 12-13 (statement of Raymond Schuck, Customer,
Cambridge Credit). Schuck described how his first payment on a $90,000 debt of $2,000
was held without any portion being passed on to his creditors. Id. Furthermore, he
explained that he had no knowledge of this arrangement. Id.; MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra
note 11, at 27.
72. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 16 (statement of Jolanta Troy, Customer,
AmeriDebt).
73. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 15 (statement of John Pohlman, former employee,
Cambridge Credit). This practice might likewise be a conscious deception, Pohlman
testified, "With the time spent with the consumer so limited, I had little confidence that they
understood that the first payment was kept by Cambridge. In fact, I was trained to tell the
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cease their regular payments to creditors.74  In this case, a consumer's
debts continue to increase even though DMP payments are dutifully
made.75 This has a compounding effect on consumers, as debts increase
and their credit is damaged.76 Some CCAs even fail to explain to
debtors which accounts are covered by the DMP, or that the debtors
must contact their creditors to explain the new payment schedule.77
These errors and miscommunications also result in further failure to pay
by the debtor, which similarly undermines the DMP's purpose.78
IV. STATE OF THE LAW
A. State Enforcement
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court first upheld a state
statute prohibiting credit counseling.79 Most states now have statutes
that regulate credit counseling. 80 These statutes functionally prevent
credit counseling by for-profit entities.81  State statutes typically refer to
credit counseling as "debt adjusting ' 82 or "debt pooling. 83  Common
methods for states to limit credit counseling include: (1) entirely
forbidding credit counseling with exceptions for non-profit
customer, 'I will be faxing you the paperwork - it is very simple and easy to fill out -
shouldn't take you ten minutes.' But this was a pressure tactic we were supposed to use."
Id.
74. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 12-14 (statement of Raymond Schuck, Customer,
Cambridge Credit) & 16-17 (statement of Jolanta Troy, Customer, AmeriDebt).
75. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 12-14 (statement of Raymond Schuck, Customer,
Cambridge Credit); Pushed Off the Financial Cliff, CONSUMER REPORTS, July 2001, at
http://www.consumerreports.org/main/detail.jsp?CONTENT%3C%3Ecnt-id=85425&FOL
DER%3C%3Efolderid= 18151.
76. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 13 (statement of Raymond Schuck, Customer,
Cambridge Credit). Schuck described having his credit rating ruined and having the interest
rates on his credit cards increased in one case from 9% to 24%. Id.
77. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 12-14 (statement of Raymond Schuck, Customer,
Cambridge Credit) & 16-17 (statement of Jolanta Troy, Customer, AmeriDebt).
78. See id.
79. See Ferguson v. Skurpa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding Kansas statute that made
debt adjusting a misdemeanor, except for as part of the practice of law, against claims that
this statute violated the due process clause of the Constitution).
80. See infra note 84.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-424 (2004)
83. See, e.g., 18 PA.C.S. § 7312 (2004)
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institutions;8 4  (2) forbidding the collection of fees for credit
counseling; 85 or (3) a combination of both methods. 86 Many states have
statutory exceptions that permit credit counseling by attorneys as part of
the practice of law87 or credit counseling without charging fees. 88 Other
states achieve the same outcomes through special licensing
requirements.8 9
Though numerous states have sued CCAs for breach of
fiduciary duty and unfair and deceptive trade practices in addition to
direct claims of operating for-profit, 90 state actions against CCAs have
84. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-63-304 & 305(6) (2004) (Arkansas allows nonprofit
organizations without fee or charge exceeding actual expenses); DEL. CODE ANN. 11 § 910
(2004) (in Delaware it is a misdemeanor and charitable and non-profits may charge a
nominal amount for reimbursement); GA. CODE ANN. § 18-5-2 (2004) (Georgia law creates
a misdemeanor and requires that no fee exceed 7.5 percent of the amount paid monthly);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 446-2 & 3 (2004) (Hawaii has a penalty of $500 or imprisoned not more
than six months and limits the practice to non-profits or charitable institutions charging a
nominal sum); IDAHO CODE § 26-2222 (2004) (Idaho only permits practice by § 501(c)(3)
non-profits operating with a permit); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 380.990 & § 380.03 (2004)
(2004) (In Kentucky debt adjusting is misdemeanor with the exception an for § 501(c)(3).);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:331 (2004) (Louisiana has exceptions for non-profits); MASS. GEN.
LAWS CH. 180, 4A (2004) (Massachusetts only permitted for non-profits); MINN. STAT. §
332.37(11) (2004) (Minnesota forbids the charging of fees); Mo. REV. STAT. § 425.020 &
425.04(5) (2004) (Missouri makes debt adjusting a misdemeanor unless performed without
compensation); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-3-202 & 203(5) (2003) (debt adjusting in Montana
is a misdemeanor unless CCA is nonprofit or charitable); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-2-2 & 4
(2004) (New Mexico makes debt adjusting a misdemeanor unless performed no
compensation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-424 & 426(3) (2004) (North Carolina makes debt
adjusting a misdemeanor unless there is no charge to debtor); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-06-02
& 03 (2003) (North Dakota makes debt adjusting a misdemeanor, but the practice is
permitted for non-profits or charitable institutions; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7312 (2004)
(Pennsylvania makes debt adjusting a misdemeanor); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-47-2 &
3 (2004) (South Dakota treats debt adjusting as a misdemeanor but contains a non-profit
exception); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-142 (2004) (Tennessee allows $20 dollar maximum
monthly fee offered by a non-profit); WASH. REV. CODE § 18.28.010(2)(f) (Washington
State only allows debt adjusting by a non-profit); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-14-102 (2003).
85. See supra note 84.
86. See supra note 84.
87. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-06-03(1) (2003).
88. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-426(4) (2004).
89. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-656 (2003) (Connecticut limits the practice to non-profits),
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.414 (2004) (Michigan licenses are permitted to § 501(c)(3)
agencies); NEV. REV. STAT. § 676.320 (2004) (Nevada makes operating without a license a
misdemeanor); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 399-D:2 (2004) (New Hampshire has a licensing
requirement; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16G-6 (2004) (In New Jersey the maximum fee is set by
commissioner)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 4710.02 (2004) (Ohio has a licensing requirement);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-66-2 (2004) (Rhode Island has a licensing requirement).
90. See Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Florida Gulf Coast, Inc. v. State of
Florida, Dept. of Revenue, 742 So. 2d 259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). (A CCAs non-profit
petition was denied under state law); See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 30.
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come only sporadically and have not prevented the broader practice of
credit counseling by Recent Entrants.9' For example, AmeriDebt
simply adopted non-profit status in response to a Maryland state
action.92 Cambridge Credit and Brighton Credit Corporation were
similarly created to avoid state enforcement. 93 After being forced out of
New York by the New York Banking Department, the founders of the
Cambridge-Brighton conglomeration, John and Richard Puccio, simply
moved their operations to Massachusetts.94 In Massachusetts, they split
their operation between Cambridge Credit, a non-profit which initiates
contact with the debtors, and Brighton, a for-profit corporation designed
to administer the DMPs.
95
The Consumer Federation of America and the National
Consumer Law Center have advocated for a Uniform Consumer Debt
Counseling Act (UCDCA).96 At over twenty pages, the model act is far
more complex than most existing state statutes, and includes a very
different approach to regulating credit counseling. 97  Unlike the
approach of most current state statutes, the UCDCA does not seek to
simply prevent credit counseling by for-profit institutions. 98  The
UCDCA instead advocates for far more comprehensive regulation,
including requiring the maintenance of bonds, 99  one-on-one
counseling,100 and extensive reporting to consumers.10' The UCDCA
Suits have been filed by the District of Columbia, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, and Texas
against AmeriDebt. Id. Cambridge Credit Counseling has been sued by Massachusetts and
North Carolina. AG Files Suit Againt Agwan Nonprofit, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 6, 2004 at
E2; Press Release, N.C. Attorney General's Office, Cambridge Credit to Give More than
One Million Back to N.C. Consumers (Jan. 11, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina
Banking Institute Journal); CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra
note 3, at 38. The majority of states do not enforce against non-profits that have attained
federal non-profit status. See id. Many states debt pooling statutes explicitly refer to §
501(c) status. See e.g., IDAHO CODE § 26-2222 (2004).
91. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 30-31. State actions did prevent
AmeriDebt from taking on new customers. It should be noted that lawsuits have also been
filed by private parties in Illinois, Alabama, California. Id.
92. See id. at 7.
93. See id. at 17-18.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See UNIFORM CONSUMER DEBT COUNSELING ACT (Proposed Draft Jan. 2005), at
http://www.law.upenn. edu/bll/ulcIUCDC/2005JanRedlineDraft.htm.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. § 12.
100. See id. § 14(b)(1).
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also institutes criminal penalties for violating the act. 0 2  While the
UCDCA thoroughly regulates credit counseling, it would require broad
if not universal adoption to have a decisive effect on Recent Entrants.
Currently, the Maryland Debt Management Services Act'0 3 is the only
state statute heavily influenced by the UCDCA.
B. Federal Enforcement
1. The Future of Bankruptcy
Pending bankruptcy legislation makes the fight over credit
counseling more contentious.' °4 Demand for CCAs is expected to
immediately increase by one third if H.R. 975 is passed.'05 This is
because Section 106 of the bill requires an individual to participate in a
budget analysis with an approved CCA 180 days prior to filing for
bankruptcy. 0 6 Furthermore, discharge under Chapter 7 or 13 would be
granted only after an "instructional course concerning personal financial
management."' 107  Under H.R. 975, both of these functions must be
completed with a CCA certified by the United States Bankruptcy
Trustee or Administrator.10 8 The bill only permits CCAs to participate
if: (1) the majority of the board of directors is not employed or
benefiting financially from the CCA, (2) fees are reasonable and waived
if the debtor is unable to pay, (3) audits are performed annually, (4)
adequate counseling is given, including consideration of the current
financial condition of the debtor, (5) no commissions are paid to
employees based upon outcomes of the counseling, (6) the CCA
101. See id. § 14(c).
102. See id. § 25.
103. See MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 12-901 to 12-93 1. Like the UCDCA, the Maryland
Debt Management Services Act does not contain a prohibition against the for-profit practice
of credit counseling and maintains similar criminal penalties. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §
12-929.
104. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 975,
108th Cong. (2003). The last major action for H.R. 975 was being placed on the Senate
Calendar for the 108th Congress in March of 2003. Bill Summary and Status for the 108th
Congress, Thomas: Library of Congress, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d108:H.R.975:.
105. See Pushed Off the Financial Cliff, supra note 75.
106. H.R. 975 § 106(a).
107. H.R. 975 § 106(b).
108. H.R. 975§ 111.
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demonstrates adequate experience in credit counseling, and (7) the CCA
must possess adequate finances to offer counseling through the course
of repayment.'0 9 For a CCA, approval to counsel bankruptcy applicants
would open a significantly captive market; therefore, it is anticipated
that CCAs will fight very hard to be approved by the United States
Bankruptcy Trustee. While many CCAs may be willing to change
policies in order to comply with the requirements of H.R. 975, a
significant market will undoubtedly remain for non-bankruptcy CCAs,
as three million debtors went to CCAs last year and only 1.4 million
people filed for bankruptcy.11° Therefore, a significant and growing
base of debtors will remain for Recent Entrants to exploit."1  While
H.R. 975 may be helpful in persuading some CCAs to change their
policies, bankruptcy reform will not affect Recent Entrants that depend
on employing deceptive practices and charging excessive fees.
2. Federal Trade Commission
Congress and federal agencies are actively scrutinizing CCAs. 112
In 2003, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a claim against
non-profit AmeriDebt and its for-profit associate, Debtworks, for
violating the disclosure requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act. 1 3  More recently the FTC successfully forced the shutdown of
National Consumer Council of Santa Ana for making false assertions
that the CCA could make individuals debt-free."14
The FTC possesses the power to prohibit unfair and deceptive
trade practices," 5 but a central obstacle for the FTC in pursuing claims
against CCAs has been statutory protections for non-profits. 1 6 Under
109. Id.
110. See Pushed Off the Financial Cliff, supra note 75.
111. See id.
112. Senate Hearing, supra note 1; See House Hearing, supra note 36.
113. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, Agency Alleges the Credit Counseling Firm
Misrepresents Costs and the Nature of Its Services, F.T.C. (Nov. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/11/ameridebt.htm; See also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L.
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in scattered section of 12 U.S.C.).
114. David Breitkopf, The FTC Puts Some Heat On Debt-Repair Agencies, AM.
BANKER, May 10, 2004 at 6.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2003).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 44 (2003) (defining corporation as "organized to carry on business for
its own profit or that of its members."); See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756,
768 (1999) (holding that "Nonprofit entities organized on behalf of for-profit members have
20051
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15 U.S.C. § 44117 the FTC lacks jurisdiction over non-profits unless it
can be demonstrated that the entity (1) is "organized to carry on
business for its own profit or that of its members;" (2) is a "mere
instrumentality" of a for-profit entity; or (3) is part of a "common
enterprise" with a for-profit entity."'
In addition to facing these hurdles, many of the aggressive
practices of Recent Entrants do not constitute unfair or deceptive acts by
the CCAs. While certain advertising and assertions by CCAs could
qualify as deceptive commercial practices, disproportionately high fees
and the failure to provide counseling to consumers do not really
implicate claims of unfair and deceptive commercial practices.19
Finally, successful claims of unfair and deceptive trade practices against
one CCA will only curb those specific practices among other CCAs,
and will not affect broader profit motive in the industry.
V. ENFORCEMENT THROUGH THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
Non-profit recognition is critical to CCAs due to the large
number of states that prohibit credit counseling by for-profit entities.12°
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) therefore possesses indirect
enforcement powers over CCAs. Recently the IRS has become more
aggressive, threatening to revoke the non-profit classification of Recent
Entrants and make criminal referrals to the Department of Justice. 21
Currently the IRS seems to hope that the mere threat of action will force
compliance by CCAs.
122
A. Ensuring Counseling Services
Unlike potential enforcement by the FTC, the IRS is in a
the same capacity and derivatively, at least, the same incentives as for-profit organizations
to engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair and deceptive acts.").
117. 15 U.S.C. § 44 (2003).
118. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 32.
119. See Am. Fin. Serv. Assoc. v. F.T.C., 767 F.2d 957, 982 (1985). The FTC may not
intervene simply because the market is not providing the "best deal." Id.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 84.
121. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 79 (statement of Mark Everson, Commissioner,
IRS).
122. Eileen Ambrose, IRS May Revoke Nonprofit Status from Some Credit Counseling
Agencies, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 25, 2004.
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position to ensure that counseling services are offered by CCAs. CCAs
obtain non-profit status by complying with § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code. Section 501(c)(3) non-profit status is limited to
institutions that have a specific list of goals, 123 and tax exempt status
may be revoked if it is determined that the non-profit does not
exclusively serve one of the § 501(c)(3) permissible functions. 124 CCAs
were first officially recognized as being eligible for § 501(c)(3) status in
1969 on the basis of the "educational" benefit they supplied. 12  At that
time, the IRS ruled that CCAs should be recognized as § 501(c)(3)
organizations because CCAs (1) only collect voluntary contributions
and (2) "provid[e] the public with information on budgeting, buying
practices, .... the sound use of consumer credit, [and] ... instruct[s] the
public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the
community.' 26
In 1978, the U.S. Tax Court in Consumer Credit Counseling
Service of Alabama, Inc. v. United States, 127 struck down the IRS
123. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2003). This section provides that:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual." Id.
It should be noted that CCAs also qualify as § 501(c)(4) institutions but that this status
offers little protection against consumer protection laws.
See House Hearing, supra note 36, at 12 (statement of Mark Everson, Commissioner, IRS).
124. See Christian Stewardship Assistance, Inc. v. Comm'n, 70 U.S.T.C. 1037, 1040
(1978).
125. See Rev. Rul. 69-441, 1969-2 C.B. 115. The revised rule states that:
[The agency] provides information to the public on budgeting, buying
practices, and the sound use of consumer credit through the use of films,
speakers, and publications. It aids low-income individuals and families
who have financial problems by providing them with individual
counseling and, if necessary, by establishing budget plans. Under a
budget plan, the debtor voluntarily makes fixed payments to the
organization. The funds are kept in a trust account and disbursed on a
partial payment basis to the creditors, whose approval of the
establishment of the plan is obtained by the organization. These
services are provided without charge to the debtor. Id.
See also House Hearing, supra note 36, at 12 (statement of Mark Everson, Commissioner,
IRS); Rev. Rul. 69-441, 1969-2 C.B. 115.
126. Rev. Rul. 69-441, 1969-2 C.B. 115.
127. Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Ala., Inc. v. U.S., 78-2 U.S.T.C. 9660
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mandate that a CCA cannot charge fees and still be eligible for
§ 501(c)(3) status. 128 The U.S. Tax Court also upheld the use of DMPs
by CCAs so long as they were incidental to the primary function of
counseling, 129 but Recent Entrants do not even meet this more lenient
standard of Consumer Credit. 130 Recent Entrants cannot claim that
counseling is their primary function when they offer no sincere
counseling services. 131 Therefore, the IRS should be able to successfully
argue that Recent Entrants must supply counseling services to their
clients to continue to qualify as fulfilling an educational purpose.
132
Currently, the IRS has promised to carefully consider the
educational purpose of a CCA in deciding whether to grant § 501(c)(3)
status in the future. 133  In fact, the IRS has already created extensive
guidelines for organizations applying for § 501(c)(3) exemptions.
134
This alone is not enough to remedy the difficulties in the credit
counseling industry. Instead, the IRS should also consider the
educational programs of existing CCAs, most centrally counseling, in
actively revoking the § 501(c)(3) status and assessing penalties against
unscrupulous CCAs.
(D.D.C. 1978); See also Credit Counseling Centers of Okla., Inc. v. U.S., 79-2 U.S.T.C.
9468 (1979).
128. See Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Ala., 78-2 U.S.T.C. at 9660. The central
activity of CCAs were truly educational and DMP's were considered adjunct to this service.
Id. While the IRS originally required CCAs to focus upon lower income clientele and to
refrain from charging fees, this requirement was judicially undone in Consumer Credit
Counseling Service of Alabama, Inc. v. United States. Id. The Tax Court was persuaded
that § 501(c)(3) did not contain such requirements and held that educational services and the
public value of credit counseling were sufficient grounds to establish the non-profit status of
CCAs. Id.; House Hearing, supra note 36, at 13-14 (statement of Mark Everson,
Commissioner, IRS). Everson stated the IRS was more carefully scrutinizing CCAs as they
seek exemptions. Id.
129. See Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Ala., 78-2 U.S.T.C. at 9660; MAJORITY &
MINORITY, supra note 11, at 2-3.
130. See MAJORITY & MINORITY. supra note 11, at 2; Senate Hearing, supra note I , at
15 (statement of John Pohlman, Former Employee, Cambridge Credit).
131. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 15 (statement of John Pohlman, Former Employee,
Cambridge Credit).
132. See Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Ala., 78-2 U.S.T.C. at 9660.
133. Debra Cowen & Debra Kawecki, Credit Counseling Organizations (2004), at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopica0 4 .pdf. The exemption application sheet includes
the questions: "State whether your counselors are certified to perform credit repair services.
Please indicate the name of the certifying organization and whether it is a federal, state, or
private certification organization," and "walk us through a client encounter." Id. at 21-23.
134. See id.
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B. Private Benefit
The IRS may also revoke the non-profit status of any non-profit
whose earnings inure to a private party.1 35  As noted earlier, many
Recent Entrants have avoided state regulation by creating a for-profit
company that performs services for the non-profit wing.136  In one
example, the non-profit AmeriDebt merely contacted the debtors, while
the for-profit Debtworks administered the DMPs.'37 While it is
permissible for a non-profit to employ the services of a for-profit entity,
the for-profit cannot possess control over the non-profit. 138  The
Cambridge-Brighton conglomeration blatantly violated this probation
by having its founders directly control the for-profit and non-profit
entities. 39
Other CCAs have been more subtle by simply creating contracts
between the for-profit and the non-profit entity. The use of a
contractual obligation as an informal controlling mechanism can also
represent an illegitimate private benefit.140 Fulfillment agreements, such
as those employed by AmeriDebt ensure that all CCA functions are
performed by a for-profit entity. 14 1 In Est of Hawaii v. Commissioner,
the U.S. Tax Court held that a contract, much like those maintained by
many Recent Entrants, which functionally binds the non-profit to the
for-profit, constitutes grounds for revocation of non-profit status.1
4 2
Additionally, the Tax Court in Est of Hawaii found it significant that
non-profit status was simply being used to fulfill a contractual
obligation. 143 Similarly, by their own admission, Recent Entrants only
exist as non-profits to satisfy state law. 44
135. See United Cancer Council v. Comm'n, 109 U.S.T.C. 326, 382 (1997); 26 C.F.R.
§ § 1.501(a)-i (c), (c)(3)-l (d)(1)(i) (2004).
136. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 9.
137. See id.
138. See Est of Hawaii v. Commissioner, 7 U.S.T.C. 1067 (1979).
139. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 19. To further extract profits from the
non-profit operation, the for-profit branch of Cambridge-Brighton sold the rights to its name
to the non-profit entity, allowing the non-profit to pay with note. Id. at 3 & 19-20.
140. See Est of Hawaii, 71 U.S.T.C. at 1080-81.
141. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 9.
142. See Est of Hawaii, 71 U.S.T.C. at 1080-81.
143. Id. at 1080.
144. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 35 (statement of Matthew Case, CEO,
AmeriDebt). During testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, Case
admitted that non-profit protection was in place for the purpose of complying with state law.
2005]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
Another advantage of IRS regulation is that it allows for a more
measured approach. As an alternative to or in addition to revocation of
§ 501(c)(3) status, the IRS may pursue intermediate sanctions against
Recent Entrants.145 Any individual "in a position to exercise substantial
influence over the affairs of the organization"'146 ("a disqualified
person") who receives a private inurement is subject to a twenty-five
percent penalty on that benefit or eventually a two-hundred percent
fine. 147  This is another powerful but flexible tool of enforcement
available to the IRS.
C. Outlook on IRS Enforcement
In fairness, it should be noted that the IRS lacks the resources to
pursue all Recent Entrants. In fact, when asked what legislative
changes would most benefit the IRS in pursuing unscrupulous CCAs,
the Commissioner of the IRS suggested that more money for
enforcement was the first priority. 148  With for-profit motives and a
questionable structure so closely correlated with unfair practices, 149 it is
anticipated that IRS could focus on the most unscrupulous Recent
Entrants. Currently the IRS is auditing fifty credit counseling agencies,
including nine of the fifteen largest. 15  This will hopefully be the first
concerted effort to reform credit counseling.151
VI. CONCLUSION
CCAs were first established by creditors as a way to encourage
more responsible spending by debtors. 152 Early CCAs were small local
institutions focused on counseling. 153  These CCAs sometimes also
Id.
145. See 26 U.S.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (2003).
146. See 26 U.S.C. § 4958(f)(1)(A) (2003).
147. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 5 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4958(a)(1), (b)).
148. See Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 83-84 (statement of Mark Everson,
Commissioner, IRS).
149. See CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 20.
150. See MAJORITY & MINORITY, supra note 11, at 31.
151. Id. at 31-32.
152. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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negotiated formal concessions called DMPs. 54 Creditors were willing
to make concessions because they believed that DMPs coupled with
counseling would increase the chances that the debtor would not declare
bankruptcy.
1 55
The NFCC, the self-regulating body of CCAs, was sued in 1994
by a small group of non-member CCAs. 156 The NFCC settled the case
and lost the capacity to regulate credit counseling. 157 Without regulation
and due to growing consumer indebtedness, the number of independent
CCAs skyrocketed. 158  These Recent Entrants aggressively market
DMPs and offer little or no actual counseling to consumers. 159 Recent
Entrants also charge extremely high fees and often deceive consumers
about the terms of the DMP.
60
The question becomes how to regulate CCAs. Almost all states
have laws restricting credit counseling. 161 For example, most states only
permit credit counseling by non-profit institutions. 161 While this
restriction has forced many CCAs to adopt § 501(c)(3) status, Recent
Entrants continue to operate with a profit motive. 163 On the federal
level, the Senate is currently considering bankruptcy legislation that
would require debtors to go through credit counseling before filing for
bankruptcy.' 64 This legislation places strict requirements on CCAs that
offer such counseling. 165 Unfortunately, the growth of consumer debt
represents plenty of opportunity for Recent Entrants to find new
business without being certified as bankruptcy eligible CCAs.
166
Also on the Federal level, the FTC faces numerous hurdles in
regulating credit counseling.1 67 First, the FTC must prove that a non-
154. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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profit status is somehow a sham. 168 Additionally, the FTC cannot base
claims simply on the grounds of excessive fees or profit motive. 169
The best opportunity under current law to effectively regulate
credit counseling exists with the IRS."7 ° Because CCAs must be non-
profits in order to operate under state law, the IRS is in a position to
regulate CCAs.17 1 Under current precedent, in order to organize as a
§ 501(c)(3) a CCA must be operating exclusively for an educational
purpose. 172 The IRS may therefore seek revocation of CCAs that offer
inadequate counseling services. 173 The IRS can also seek the revocation
of § 501(c)(3) status for CCAs that are structured for private
inurement. 174  Recent Entrants violate this inurement restriction by
maintaining contracts that bind the CCAs to for-profit entities. 75
Finally, the IRS has the flexibility to fine private parties who have
received these private inurements. 176 Given the power, flexibility, and
precedent under the U.S. Tax Court, the IRS is in the best position to
pursue Recent Entrants that are injuring consumers.
JOHN HURST
168. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
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